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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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and 
All other persons unknown 
claiming any right, title, 
estate, lien, or interest 
in the real property described 
in Plaintiff's complaint 
adverse to Plaintiff's owner-
ship or any cloud upon 
Plaintiff's title thereto, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
) CASE NO. 20169 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS DARWIN DIRKS 
AND JACQUELYN DIRKS IN ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS' APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
There are two main issues presented for review. First, 
shall this Court overrule its previous holdings in Jeffs v. Citizens 
Finance Company, 319 P.2d 858 (Utah 1958) and Wiscombe v. Lockhart 
Co., 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980) where it held that in cases such 
1 
as the one at bar, it was up to the one who took an interest 
in a real estate contract (the Defendants Goodwills, here) as 
pledge for a loan to seek out and determine the status of his 
assignor's rights and obligations? Second, does the mere existence 
of statutes which regulate Quiet Title Actions and Mortgage 
Foreclosures and the provision by the state of a neutral court 
system to settle private disputes involving land constitute 
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSr STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The Due Process Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution states, " [N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law;, . . ." 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures states 
in appropriate part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This proceeding is a Quiet Tiule Action wherein all 
defendants have been eliminated except the Defendants-appellants 
Wilford w. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill. Record at 120-122. 
Judge Ronald 0. Hyde of the Second Judicial District Court granted 
2 
Plaintiffs-Respondents Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks1 Motion 
For Summary Judgment against the Goodwills. Record at 103-104. 
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented 
for review: 
On June 10, 1977, Alma S. Butler and his wife, Wanda 
R. Butler, purchased a piece of real property in Roy, Utah. 
Approximately a year later, on May 15, 1978, the Butlers sold 
that property to Paul S. Cornwell and Catherine L. Cornwell 
on a Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Cornwells recorded a 
Buyer's Notice of Contract on May 16, 1978. Record at 59. 
The Cornwells failed to make their payments as required 
by the contract and on February 17, 1981, the Butlers notified 
the Cornwells that the Cornwells were in default on their Uniform 
Real Estate Contract and on March 4, 1981, the Butlers sent 
a Notice of Default and Cancellation of Contract to the Cornwells. 
This Notice was recorded on March 12, 1981. Record at 59. 
On March 3, 1980, the Cornwells executed a trust deed 
on this property in favor of Stewart Title Company of Ogden 
as trustee and Wilford W. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill as 
beneficiaries. This trust deed was for the purpose of securing 
payment of a promissory note in the sum of $38,000.00. It was 
recorded on April 3, 1980. Record at 60, 89. 
The Butlers were unaware when they sent the Notice 
of Default and Cancellation of Contract that the Cornwells had 
executed the trust deed. The Butlers did not become aware of 
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the existence of this Trust Deed until approximately March 20, 
1981. Record at 60. 
On March 23, 1981, the Butlers conveyed the property 
to Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks, the plaintiffs in the Quiet 
Title Action. Record at 60. 
It must be noted that Plaintiffs disagree with some 
of the statements contained in the Defendants1 Statement of 
Facts. First, Goodwills assert several times that a foreclosure 
proceeding was involved at some point in this action. This 
is not true. The Butlers repossessed the property in question 
under the terms of a Uniform Real Estate Contract, not in a 
foreclosure proceeding. Record at 59, 62, 64. Second, Defendants 
included some statements as facts when they are clearly not 
facts but arguments, e.g., that Goodwills had a right to notice 
and a hearing before Butlers repossessed the property. Defendants1 
brief at page 4. 
Finally, Defendants assert in their Statement of Facts 
at page 3 of their brief that they (the Goodwills) had a security 
interest in the property in question of $38,000. This is not 
true. While it is a fact that Goodwills loaned their assignors, 
Cornwells, $38,000, Cornwells had only about $9,000 equity in 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract which they signed with the 
Butlers. Since the assignee can take no more interest than 
his assignor had, Goodwills had no more than $9,000 security 
interest in the property. 
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An examination of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
executed by the Butlers and the Cornwells reveals that the purchase 
price paid by the Cornwells for the property was $71,000 with 
$8,000 being paid down and the $63,000 balance plus 9-1/4% interest 
to be paid at the rate of $506.92 each month, beginning July 
1, 1978. Record at 61. These figures reveal that less than 
$25.00 per month of the $506.92 payment was applied to the princi-
pal. The Cornwells paid on this contract from July 1, 1978 
until March 3, 1980, a total of 21 payments, before using this 
contract to secure their loan from the Goodwills. Record at 
60, 61, 89. Therefore, on March 3, 1980, when the Cornwells 
executed their trust deed with the Goodwills, the Cornwells1 
equity in the Uniform Real Estate Contract was less than $9,000. 
Even if Cornwells had paid the $5,000 lump sum payment which 
the contract required to be paid on November 15, 1979 (which 
they did not), their equity would have been less than $14,000. 
This is a far cry from the $38,000 which Goodwills now claim 
as their lost security interest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is compelling precedent in this jurisdiction 
to affirm the lower court's order granting plaintiffs1 motion 
for Summary Judgment. The 1958 case of Jeffff v_«_ Citizens Finance 
Company, 319 P.2d 858 (Utah 1958), and the 1980 case of Wiscombe 
v. Lockhart Co. , 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 1980), invplved fact situations 
almost identical to the one at bar. In both cases this Court 
held that it was up to the purchaser's assignee (the Goodwills 
5 
here) to seek out the vendor (the Butlers) and offer to fulfill 
his assignor's obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
if he wanted to preserve his interest in that contract. Since 
the Goodwills did not do this, they have no further interest 
in the contract. Other state supreme courts have reached similar 
conclusions. 
The requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause do not apply in the instant case. They apply 
only to state action and there was absolutely no state action 
involved in this case where private parties repossessed their 
private property from other private parties under the terms 
of a private contract without invoking the aid or assistance 
of any state official. 
In situations such as the one at bar, not involving 
racial discrimination, the mere existence of statutes regulating 
Quiet Title Actions and Mortgage Foreclosures and the provision 
by the state of a neutral court system to settle private disputes 
is not sufficient state involvement to constitute state action 




THE GOODWILLS HAVE NO RIGHT TO NOTICE AND A HEARING. 
A. Case Law Places the Burden of Notification on 
the Goodwills. 
6 
This case presents a situation wherein the vendors 
(Butlers, Plaintiffs Dirks1 grantors) conveyed their real property 
to the purchasers (Cornwells) on a Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
the purchasers failed to comply with paragraphs 15 and 16 of 
the contract, and the vendors declared a default and elected 
to repossess the property in accordance with paragraph 16A. 
Unbeknown to the vendors, prior to the default, the purchasers 
had executed a trust deed to the property for the purpose of 
securing a promissory note. The beneficiaries of the trust 
deed (Goodwills) are the Defendants in the Quiet Title proceeding. 
Record at 59, 60. 
Since there is no genuine issue as to any of the material 
facts, the Dirks are entitled to have the lower court's order 
granting them Summary Judgment affirmed ij^  the law as applied 
to these facts so indicates. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56 (c) . 
This Court has dealt with similar situations in the 
past. A 1958 case involved a proceeding that closely parallels 
the one at bar. Jeffs v. Citizens Finance Company, 319 P.2d 
858 (Utah 1958) . In that instance, a vendor sold the property 
which was the subject of the quiet title action to a purchaser 
on a Uniform Title Retaining Real Estate Contract. The purchaser 
then borrowed a sum of money from the defendant in the action 
and assigned the contract to the defendant for the purpose of 
securing the loan. The defendant recorded the assignment but 
apparently did not inform the vendor of that fact. The vendor 
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then sold her interest in the property to another party who 
became the plaintiff in the Quiet Title Action. 
This new owner had no actual knowledge of the assignment 
to the defendant. The purchasers then became delinquent under 
the terms of the contract and the new owner obtained a default 
judgment in accordance with the terms of the contract and took 
possession. When the new owner became aware of the assignment 
made by the purchaser, he initiated the Quiet Title Action. 
In affirming the lower Court's decision to quiet title 
in the new owner, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Under such circumstance [where the assignment was 
for the purpose of securing a loan], if the lender 
wishes to protect his loan after his assignor defaults 
on the real estate contract, it is essential that 
he [the lendor (the Goodwills in our case)] make a 
tender of full and unqualified performance with respect 
to those provisions uncomplied with by the assignor 
[the Cornwells in our case]. 
Jeffs v. Citizens Finance Company, Id. 
In the instant case, as in Jeffs, the lender (the 
Goodwills) did not make a tender of full and unqualified performance 
before the purchasers (the Cornwells) defaulted on their contract 
obligations, or ever. 
The Court went on to state: 
Where no tender of unqualified performance is made, 
there is no duty on the part of the seller of the 
real estate to recognize any interest asserted Dy 
such assignee, since the seller at least is entitled 
to performance. . . . In our opinion it is no answer 
to say that giving r.otice to the seller, either actual 
or constructive, places the burden on him to seek 
out one with whom he had no dealing, and volunteer 
facts so that an assignee of a real estate contract 
securing a loan may elect whether to perform the real 
8 
estate contract or not. . . . Requiring diligence 
on the part of the one holding a real estate contract 
securing a loan, under a sort of pledge, to seek out 
and determine the status of his assignor's contractual 
rights and obligations by way of request, discovery 
procedure or otherwise, and to require him to make 
a tender of full performance which his assignor has 
failed to effectuate does not seem to us to place 
an unreasonable burden on the lender who desires to 
protect the consideration for which the contract was 
assigned or pledged. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 859. 
Thus, under the holding of this case, it was up to 
the Goodwills, the beneficiaries of a trust deed given for the 
purpose of securing a loan, to seek out the Butlers and to determine 
the status of the Cornwells1 contractual obligations and to 
make a tender of full performance to the Butlers when the Cornwells 
defaulted on their contract. This, the Goodwills failed to 
do, and so cannot be heard now to claim an interest in the real 
property which secured their loan. 
In a 1980 case, the Utah Supreme Court confirmed its 
adherence to the reasoning and decision it made in the above-cited 
case. Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, 608 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1980). This case also is quite similar to the one at bar. 
The vendor sold some real property by a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract to the purchaser, the purchaser defaulted on the contract 
by failing to make an annual payment, and the vendor sent the 
purchaser a Notice of Default. When the purchaser did not remedy 
his default, the vendor respossessed the property. Unbeknown 
to the vendor, the purchaser, prior to his default, had executed 
and delivered to the lender/assignee a promissory note secured 
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in part by an assignment of all of his rights, title, and interest 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
The Court affirmed the lower court's decision quieting 
title in the vendors as against the assignee. In so doing, 
it stated: 
Fundamental to the law of assignments is the concept 
that an assignee takes nothing more by his assignment 
that his assignor had. . . . Beardall [the purchaser] 
quit the premises in question on or before February 
7, 1977, and so certainly after February 7, the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract had no further viability of its 
own. Title to the property remained in Wiscombe [the 
vendor] no longer subject to the Contract. (Footnote 
omitted). 
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id. at 238. 
The Court went on to hold that the fact that Lockhart 
(the lender/assignee) had recorded its assignment from Beardall 
(the purchaser) on November 5, 1976, did not obligate Wiscombe 
(the vendor) to recognize Lockhart's interest in the property. 
The Court stated: 
Lockhart places great emphasis on the fact that its 
Assignment was recorded and hence gave constructive 
notice to Wiscombe of the existence of the Assignment 
citing Jeffs v. Citizen's Finance Co. Lockhart argues 
there was a duty on the part of Wiscombe to recognize 
the interest of Lockhart as an assignee of Beardall's 
interest under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
This reliance by Lockhart on Jeffs is misplaced. 
In fact, Jeffs supports the decision of the District 
Court. We there stated: ". . .In our opinion, it 
is no answer to say that giving notice to the seller, 
either actual or constructive, places the burden on 
him to seek out one with whom he had no dealing, and 
volun+-per fa^ts so that the assignee of a real estate 
contract securing a loan may elect whether to perform 
the real estate contract or not. Such notice at best 
would alert the seller to the fact, that upon performance 
by the purchaser or his assignee, the seller would 
have a duty to execute a conveyance. Requiring diligence 
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on the part of one holding a real estate contract 
securing the loan, under a sort of pledge, to seek 
out and determine the status of its assignor's contractual 
rights and obligations by way of request . . . or 
otherwise • . . does not seem to us to place an unreason-
able burden on the lender who desires to protect the 
consideration for which the contract was assigned 
or pledged." (Emphasis in original) 
Id. 
Applying the reasoning and holding of Wiscombe to 
the case at bar leads to the conclusion that after Cornwells 
defaulted on their obligation under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract on March 4, 1981, and Butlers repossessed the property 
in accordance with paragraph 16A of that contract, then Cornwells 
had no more interest in the property and since Goodwills can 
have no more interest than the persons they took from, the Cornwells, 
Goodwills have had no interest in the property that is the subject 
of the quiet title action since March 4, 1981. The fact that 
Goodwills recorded their trust deed on April 3, 1980, did not 
give Butlers notice of Goodwills' interest in the property and 
did not obligate Butlers to seek the Goodwills out to see if 
the Goodwills wanted to perform the real estate contract in 
place of the Cornwells. Therefore, Goodwills' interest in this 
property was terminated on March 4, 1981, and they have no right, 
title, or interest in the property at this time. If Goodwills 
wanted to have an opportunity to perform Cornwells' obligations 
under the contract to the Butlers, it was up to the Goodwills 
to seek out the Butlers and offer to perform. It was not the 
Butlers' responsibility to notify the Goodwills, whose existence 
they were unaware of, that Cornwells had defaulted. 
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In their brief, at page 14, the Goodwills attempt 
to negate the impact of Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id., 
on their case by finding a factual difference between it and 
the case at bar. They state, 
Approximately three weeks after the foreclosure, the 
mortgagor assigned his interest to the Lockhart Company 
. . . The present case is factually distinguishable 
from Wiscombe. More specifically, the Goodwills obtained 
their security interest before the foreclosure took 
place. • • • 
Goodwills have misread Wiscombe. In Wiscombe, the 
purchaser (Beardall) assigned his interest in the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract to Lockhart almost two months before he (Beardall) 
defaulted and the vendor (Wiscombe) repossessed the property. 
The $15,000 payment due on January 1, 1977, was not 
received by Wiscombe. By Notice of Default dated 
January 31, 1977, and served on Beardall on February 
2, 1977, Wiscombe gave Beardall five days in which 
to remedy his default. Beardall did not do so and 
quit the premises on or before February 7, 1977. 
Unknown to Wiscombe, Beardall had on November 5, 1976, 
executed and delivered to Lockhart a promissory note 
secured in part by an Assignment of Contract whereby 
Beardall assigned to Lockhart all of his rights, title 
and interest in and to the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
of January 1, 1976. Lockhart subsequently recorded 
the Assignment. (Emphasis added.) 
Wiscombe v. The Lockhart Company, Id., at 237. 
Thus, it is apparent that in Wiscombe, as in the case 
at bar, the purchaser assigned his interest in the property 
to another well before the repossession, or foreclosure as Goodwills 
call it, took place. The facts in Wiscombe are virtually identical 
to the facts in this case and Wiscombe mandates that this Court 
affirm the lower court's Summary Judgment Order in favor of 
Dirks. 
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Other state supreme courts have agreed that it is 
not the responsibility of the vendor to seek out the defaulting 
purchaser's assignee or mortgagee in order to provide him an 
opportunity to cure the default. A 1969 case from Washington 
state involved an action by the representative of the deceased 
vendor to quiet title to the real property covered by a forfeitable 
real estate contract and to recover possession of the 
property. Kendrick v. Davis, 452 P.2d 222 (Wash. 1969). The 
vendor had sold two parcels of property under a real estate 
contract to the purchasers, who twice assigned their interest 
in the property to a finance company. The finance company, 
the assignee-mortgagee, recorded its interest in the property, 
and later the purchasers ceased making payments. The vendors 
then sent a Notice of Declaration of Forfeiture and Cancellation 
of Contract to the purchasers. 
The lower court held for the assignee-mortgagee but 
the Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, reversed and 
found for the vendors. In so doing, it stated: 
An instrument may in form be a deed or an assignment, 
but, if the intent is to use the property as security, 
it will be a mortgage. . . . The question presented, 
therefore, is whether the existence of such mortgages 
will render ineffective the vendor's declaration of 
forfeiture given to the purchasers alone. 
Kendrick v. Davis, Id. at 226. 
The Court went on to summarize the case in a manner 
that makes it apparent that it is very similar to the one at 
bar. It stated: 
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Simply stated, we have this case (1) a valid forfeitable 
real estate contract property recorded; (2) a purchaser 
in default; (3) a vendor declaring a forfeiture according 
to the contract terms; and (4) a mortgagee of the 
purchaser who is unknown to the vendor, but whose 
security interest is properly recorded. 
Id. at 227. 
The Court then stated that the real issue in the case was whether 
the duty of giving notice was on the vendor or the mortgagee. 
The court resolved this issue by holding that: 
The burden is on the mortgagee to notify the vendor 
of his interest in the contract. No undue burden 
is thus placed on the mortgagee as he would have actual 
knowledge both of the identify of the vendor and of 
the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture of the 
contract upon the purchaser's default. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Court then addressed the issue of whether the 
recording of the mortgages gave constructive notice of their 
existence to the vendor. The Court stated: 
But the recording of the mortgages did not give 
constructive notice of their existence to the vendor 
who was an antecedent in the chain of title. The 
recording of an instrument is constructive notice 
only to those parties acquiring interests subsequent 
to the filing and recording of the instrument. The 
recording of an instrument does not constitute notice 
to antecedents in the chain of title. (Emphasis added.) 
Id.at 228* 
The Court summarized its holding by stating: 
Defendants [the assignee-mortgagee], having failed 
to give plaintiff [the vendor] notice of their mortgagee 
interests, were not entitled to receive a notice of 
the forefeiture. The contract was forfeited in accordance 
with its terms and there is no purchaser's interest 
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r e m a i n i n g in t h e r e a l t y upon which t h e a s s i g n e e s 1 
(mortgagees ' ) claim can a t t a c h . 
Id . 
Another state supreme court has reached a similar 
conclusion to the ones reached by the Utah and Washington Supreme 
Courts. In a recent New Mexico case, a vendor sold a parcel 
of real property to the purchasers under a real estate contract. 
Shindledecker v. Savage, 627 P.2d 1241 (N.M. 1981). Later, 
the purchasers used their interest in the property for the purpose 
of securing several loans in return for which they gave what 
was called a "second mortgage" on the property. When the purchasers 
decided to move from the state, they conveyed the property back 
to the vendor. There was no evidence that the purchasers were 
in default on their contract. 
The vendor then resold the property and the creditor 
brought an action to have her "mortgage" declared superior to 
the claims of others and to have it foreclosed. The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico declared that the creditor did not have 
a true second mortgage on a fee interest but only a mortgage 
on the vendee's (purchaser's) equitable interest. In upholding 
the lower court's refusal to recognize and foreclose the creditor's 
mortgage, the court stated: 
By virtue of his mortgage, the mortgagee obtains the 
original purchaser's right to purchase the property 
for the consideration stated in +-he purchase contract. 
In other words, the mortgagee assumes the rights of 
the vendee under the real estate contract. 
Shindledecker v. Savage, Id. at 1243. 
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The court then held that even though the mortgagee 
had the right to assume the purchaser's position under the contract, 
his rights must yield to the rights of the subsequent purchasers 
of the property. In explaining this holding, the Court stated: 
The mortgagee of an equitable interest must protect 
his lien by giving notice to the vendor of his equitable 
interest so that he can arrange an assumption of the 
contract in case the vendee defaults or otherwise 
rescinds the contract. Recording the mortgage does 
not give the vendor constructive notice such as to 
require the vendor to notify the mortgagee of his 
intent to retake the property. (Citation 
omitted). (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
Two other courts have held in analagous situations 
that junior lien holders' rights can be cut off without giving 
the junior lien holder notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
In a case involving the constitutional validity of 
a section of the Georgia code which allowed the holder of legal 
title to property that had been given to him as security for 
payment of a debt to reduce the debt to judgment after default 
in the payment and then quit claim the legal title back to the 
debtor and levy upon the land and sell it in satisfaction of 
the judgment without giving any notice to the debtor or the 
debtor's grantee, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the coae section was constitutional. In so doing, the court 
stated: 
The contention that this section is unconstitutional, 
as applied to such a purchaser [from the grantor-debtor] 
rests, in the last analysis, upon the claim that he 
is entitled, as a matter of right, in accordance with 
settled usage and established principles of law, to 
notice of a proceeding, to sell the land under the 
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prior security deed and opportunity to make defense 
therein. We cannot sustain this contention. 
Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632, 634 (U.S. 1926). The Court 
went on to state: 
In the absence of a specific provision 'to that effect 
[that the holder of a mortgage or trust deed must 
give notice to a subsequent purchaser], the holder 
of a mortgage or trust deed with power of sale, is 
not required to give notice of the exercise of the 
power to a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer; and 
the validity of the sale is not affected by the fact 
that such notice is not given. . . . And it Watkins 
v. Booth, supra, 94, the court said that it was the 
duty of the subsequent lienor "to keep advised as 
to proceeding in case of the former trust deed." 
Id. at 635, 636. In a later case, a California court reached 
a similar conclusion in a suit to have a sale under a deed of 
trust declared invalid. In refusing to declare the sale invalid, 
the court stated: 
Appellants' major contention appears to be that since 
the original trustors were entitled %o have notice 
of sale mailed to them at their address as given in 
the trust deed, and since the beneficiary had been 
notified of appellant's acquisition of the property, 
and of appellants' address, appellant, as successor 
in interest to the original trustors, was entitled 
"to specific notice under Section 2924b of the Civil 
Code." This contention is untenable. . . . So, a 
purchaser of land on which there is a prior security 
deed acquires his interest in the property subject 
to the right of the holder of the secured debt to 
exercise the statutory power of sale. There is no 
established principle of law which entitles such a 
purchaser to notice of the exercise of the power. 
Lancaster Security Investment Corp. v. Kessler, 324 P.2d 634, 
636, 638 (Cal. App. 2d 1958i. 
Goodwills argue at page 10 of their brief that Butlers 
could have notified the Goodwills of Cornwells' default. While 
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it may have been possible for the Butlers to learn of the Goodwills' 
interest in the property, the courts, as the above-cited cases 
make clear, have held that it was Goodwills' responsibility 
to seek out Butlers to determine the status of their assignors' 
(Cortiwells' ) compliance with the terms of the contract. 
While the courts could have required the vendors (Butlers) 
to give notice to the purchasers' assignee (Goodwills), they 
chose not to do so for a very good, common sense reason. Butlers 
had no knowledge of the Goodwills' interest in the property 
and no economic incentive to check with the Weber County Recorders 
Office to detemine if their defaulting purchasers had assigned 
their interest to another. For them to have checked with the 
Recorders Office would have been extraordinary. 
Yet for the Goodwills to have checked the status of 
their assignor's interest in the property upon which they were 
about to loan $38,000 with the Weber County Recorders Office 
and so find Butlers' names and address, would have been very 
ordinary. They had every economic incentive to do so. In 
fact, it is precisely the kind of behavior one would expect 
from a reasonable, prudent businessman. Had Goodwills made 
such a check, they would have discovered not only Butlers' names, 
address and interest in the prop^Lty, they would have uj.scovei.ed 
that their assignors (Cornwells) had previously assigned their 
interest in the contract to Clearfield State Bank. 
B. Goodwills' Argument That Notice By Publication 
Is Constitutionally Insufficient Is Mere Surplusage. 
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At page 12 in their brief, Goodwills state: 
The Dirks further argue that the Notice of Foreclosure 
was published, and that, accordingly, the Goodwills 
were constructively served with notice. We submit 
that even notice by publication is constitutionally 
insufficient. 
Dirks never made any such argument. Such an argument 
would have been inappropriate to make for two reasons. First, 
as noted above, there was no foreclosure involved in this case. 
The Butlers repossessed their property in accordance with the 
provisions of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Record at 59, 
62, 64. Second, the Butlers were unaware of the Goodwills and 
their interest in the property until well after they had repossessed 
the property. Record at 60. Goodwills seem to be setting up 
a straw-man argument in order to knock it down. 
The cases cited by Goodwills on pages 14 and 15 of their 
brief for the proposition that powers of sale in real estate 
contracts, mortgages and trust deeds have been critically questioned 
because of the Due Process Clause are so different from the 
case at bar that they have little value as precedent. It should 
be noted that none of the cases are from Utah, the Federal District 
Court for Utah or the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. T h e 
main issue in Law v. United States Department of Agriculture, 
366 F.Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973), v;as the validity of the waiver 
of plaintiff's due process rights of prior notice. There is 
no such issue of waiver of the right to notice in the case at 
bar. Valley Development at Vail v. Warder, City of Eagle, 557 
P.2d 1180 (Colo. 1976) involved the validity of a court-held 
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summary ex parte foreclosure hearing wherein the court limited 
the subject matter of the hearing to the question of the debtor's 
military status. There was nothing like a summary ex parte 
foreclosure hearing involved in the instant case. 
Neither do the other two cases cited by Goodwills 
in this section bear a close factual relationship to the case 
at bar. In Ricker v. United States, 417 F.Supp. 133 (D. Me. 1976) 
government action was involved because a federal employee initiated 
and carried out a foreclosure sale of the mortgagor's farm. 
In our case, there was absolutely no state or government action 
involved in Butlers' repossession of the property under the 
terms of their Uniform Real Estate Contract. Finally, in Federal 
National Mortgage Association v. Beard, 659 P.2d 232 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1983), where a mortgage was being foreclosed 
and an attempt at personal service on the defendant was unsuccessful, 
the critical consideration was the distinction between knowledge 
of the defendants' mailing address, which the plaintiff had, 
and knowledge of the defendants' residence, which the plaintiff 
did not have. Obviously, the case at bar bears little resemblance 
to Beard since it involves a repossession under a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, not a foreclosure proceeding, and the Butlers 
had no knowledge of either Goodwills' residence or mailing address 
when the repossession took place. Record at 59, 60. 
It is apparent from the applicable case law that this 
Court should affirm the lower court's order granting Summary 
Judgment to the Plaintiffs-Respondents. There are two Utah 
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cases, Jeffs, v. Citizens Finance Company, supra, and Wiscombe 
v. The Lockhart Company, supra, the facts of which are virtually 
the same as the facts in the instant case, wherein this Court 
has determined that it is up to the purchaser's assignee (the 
Goodwills) of a real estate contract to seek out and notify 
the vendor (the Butlers) and determine their assignors' rights 
and obligations so that the assignee can arrange to assume the 
contract in the event the purchaser defaults in his obligations 
under the real estate contract. Other state supreme courts 
have reached the same conclusion. This the Goodwills did not 
do. These courts also argue that the recording of the assignee's 
interest in the property does not give constructive notice to 
the vendor of the subsequent interest in the property. The 
United States Supreme Court in Scott v. Paisley, supra, and 
a California appeals court in Lancaster Security Investment 
Corp. v. Kessler, supra, have held in analagous situations that 
junior lien holders' rights can be cut off without notice. 
Goodwills have cited no cases similar to the one at bar which 
have held that it was Butlers' duty to seek out Goodwills, who 
they did not know and had no reason to know, and give them notice 
of their assignors' default. 
POINT II 
UTAHfS FORECLOSURE AND QUIET TITLE PROCEDURES DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION FOR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE 
PROCESS PURPOSES. 
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Applies To State Action, 
Not To Private Action. 
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The D e f e n d a n t s ' c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the 14th Amendment's 
Due Process c l ause r e q u i r e s t h a t they be given no t i ce of B u t l e r s ' 
i n t e n t i o n to r e p o s s e s s t h e p r o p e r t y a f t e r Cornwells de fau l t ed 
has no b a s i s . The f i r s t s e c t i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment 
to the United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s t a t e s : 
[N]or s h a l l any S t a t e d e p r i v e any p e r s o n of l i f e , 
l i b e r t y , or p r o p e r t y , w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s of law; 
nor deny to any p e r s o n w i t h i n i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n t h e 
equal p r o t e c t i o n of the laws. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus , from a p l a i n r e a d i n g of t h i s p o r t i o n of the Four teenth 
Amendment, i t i s apparent t h a t i t i s the s t a t e which i s p r o h i b i t e d 
from depr iv ing persons of p rope r ty without due p r o c e s s of l aw. 
The Un i t ed State?s Supreme Court and numerous other f ede ra l and 
s t a t e c o u r t s have so h e l d . S h e l l e y v . Kraemer, 334 U.S . 1 
(U .S . 1 9 4 8 ) ; Jackson v . M e t r o p o l i t a n Edison Co. , 419 U.S. 345 
(U.S. 1974); Warren v . Government Nat ional Mortgage Assoc i a t i on , 
611 F.2d 1229 (8th C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) ; Neidner v . Sa l t River P ro jec t 
A g r i c u l t u r a l and Power D i s t r i c t , 590 P.2d 447 ( A r i z . 1 9 7 9 ) ; 
A l l i e d Shee t Metal F a b r i c a t o r s v . Peop l e s Nat iona l Bank, 518 
P.2d 734 (Wash. Ct . App. 1974). 
These cases make clear that it is a firmly established 
principle of our judicial system that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment can only be invoked when a state 
takes action to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. The Defendants acknowledged this 
fact in their brief at pages 4 and 5. 
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B . There Was Absolutely No State Action Involved 
In The Case At Bar, 
The courts have provided us with guidelines to help 
us determine how closely involved a state must be with an event 
before state involvement becomes "state action" for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. The First Circuit Court of Appeals stated 
in a recent case: 
In short, the party seeking to establish that action 
of a private party violated the Constitution must 
be able to point to the specific act or actions of 
the government which in fact motivated the private 
action. 
Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servicesy Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 450 
(1st Cir. 1983). In an earlier case, the United States Supreme 
Court found that it was not possible to generalize about when 
private action constituted state action. it stated: 
Owing to the very "largeness" of the government, a 
multitude of relationships might appear to some to 
fall within the [Fourteenth] Amendment's embrace, 
but that, it must be remembered, can be determined 
only in the framework of the peculiar facts or circum-
stances present. 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725-726 
(U.S. 1961). 
What "specific acts or actions of the government", 
Gerena, supra, "in the framework of the peculiar facts or circum-
stances," Burton, Id., of the case at bar have Goodwills pointed 
to which motivated Butlers to repossess ! the property without 
informing the Goodwills? None. 
There was absolutely no state action involved. Here 
the Butlers, the plaintiffs1 grantors, entered and repossessed 
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the property in question after the Cornwellsf the defendants' 
assignors, defaulted. They did so in accordance with the provisions 
of a private contract, a Uniform Real Estate Contract. There 
were no state officials involved nor was it done under the provisions 
of any particular state statute. It was a private action carried 
out between private citizens under the terms of a private contract. 
Since there was absolutely no state action involved in the repos-
session of the property, the defendants cannot call upon the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to support their claim 
that they were entitled to notice and a hearing before the Butlers 
repossessed the property. 
As a federal district court stated in a 1979 case 
involving the distraint of property under the terms of a commercial 
lease: 
This is a commercial lease and nowhere is unconscionability 
or inequality of bargaining power alleged. Consequently, 
the parties are bound by the clear contract language 
which allowed the landlord the right to distraint 
for unpaid rent. A remedy devised by private parties 
and executed without the help of public officials 
does not constitute state action. It is "well settled 
that the fourteenth amendment applies only to actions 
of the 'state' and not to actions which are 'private'." 
(Emphasis added.) 
SMI Industries, Inc. v. Lanard & Axilbund, Inc., 481 F.Supp. 459, 
461-462 (E.D. Pa 1979) quoting Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 
1110 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1039, 95 S.Ct. 526, 
4 2 L.Ed.2d 316. 
C. The Use Of The Courts To Enforce Private Agreements 
Not Involving Racial Discrimination Is Not State Action For 
Fourteenth Amendment Purposes. 
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The Goodwills claim at page 6 in their brief that 
the use of the courts as "the final step of quieting title" 
is sufficient state involvement to constitute state action for 
Fourteenth Amendment purposes and so to extend the Due Process 
requirements to the private agreement between Butlers and Cornwells. 
Their main support for this proposition is the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, 3 34 U.S. 1 (U. S. 1948). 
While a superficial reading of Shelley v. Kraemer 
may lead one to believe that the Supreme Court held that any 
use of the courts to enforce a private agreement brought that 
agreement within the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
a more careful analysis of the case reveals that the Court's 
holding was much more limited than that and!f in fact, does not 
bring the judicial enforcement of a private agreement such as 
the one at bar, within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
It must be noted that in Shelley v. Kraemer, the private agreement 
in question was a restrictive covenant that prohibited the use 
of the property involved to any person not of the Caucasian 
race. This covenant was broken by private parties. 
On August 11, 1945, pursuant to a contract of sale, 
petitioners Shelley, who are Negroes, for valuable 
consideration received from one Fitzgerald a warranty 
deed to the parcel in question. 
Icl. at 5. 
It was another owner of property subject to the covenants 
who brought the suit to have the covenants enforced by restraining 
Shelleys from taking possession of the property and by divesting 
them of title to the property. The trial court denied the requested 
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relief on the ground that the restrictive agreement had never 
become effective because it had not been signed, as intended, 
by all property owners in the district. It was in this posture 
that the case went to the Supreme Court of Missouri, i.e., with 
the Negroes Shelley holding title to the property and occupying 
it under the terms of a private sale. 
The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc reversed 
and directed the trial court to grant the relief for 
which respondents had prayed. That court held the 
[restrictive covenant] agreement effective and concluded 
that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights 
guaranteed to petitioners by the Federal Constitution. 
At the time the court rendered its decision, petitioners 
were occupying the property in question. 
Id. at 6. 
It is apparent, then, that without the positive action 
of the Missouri Supreme Court, the Negroes Shelley would have 
had title to, and possession of, the property despite the restrictive 
covenants. It was this positive action by the Missouri Supreme 
Court to which the United States Supreme Court particularly 
objected. It stated: 
We have no doubt that there has been state action 
in these cases [a second case with similar facts was 
decided at the same time] in the full and complete 
sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose 
that petitioners were willing purchasers of properties 
upon which they desired to establish homes. The owners 
of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts 
of sale were accordingly consummated. It is clear 
•chat out for the active intervention of the state 
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, 
petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties 
in question without restraint. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 19. 
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Besides this positive impact of the state court's 
action on the status quo, another reason that the Supreme Court 
in Shelley v. Kraemer found state action for Fourteenth Amendment 
purposes was the fact that the case involved racial discrimination, 
the prevention of which was the precise reason for the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Several federal courts have acknow-
ledged the fact that when racial discrimination is present in 
a case, it takes less state involvement to constitute state 
action and so invokes the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In a 1974 case involving an action brought under the 
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, a car buyer alleged 
that state action was present when the cai: dealer resorted to 
self-help repossession which was permitted in the contract between 
the parties. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
United States District Court's dismissal of the suit. In so 
doing, the court stated: 
We are likewise pursuaded that Reitman [Reitman v. Mulkey, 
387 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1967), which invalidated a California 
constitutional provision that permitted racial discrimi-
nation in housing] cannot be relied upon to justify 
a finding of state action here. Our opinion in Palmer 
notwithstanding, 479 F. 2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973), we 
view Reitman as dealing with a state attempt to accomplish 
indirectly what it was prohibited from doing directly. 
We cannot ignore the fact that the context of onerous 
racial discrimination in which the case was set demanded 
special scrutiny. The injustices of racial discrimination 
cast a different shadow than that of the case before 
us. (Citation omitted) (Emphasis added). 
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1974). 
The United States District Court for Nebraska expressed 
a similar sentiment in an earlier case which involved the question 
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of whether self-help repossession of an automobile under the 
terms of the Nebraska Commercial Code constituted state action 
so as to allow the plaintiff to invoke the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In dismissing the action for lack 
of jurisdiction, the court stated: 
It must also be remembered that such cases as Reitman 
grew out of the pervasive evil of racial discrimination, 
which demands peculiarly stringent procedures for 
erad icat i on. No racial considerations infest the 
present case, (Emphasis added). 
Pease v. Havelock, 351 F.Supp. 118, 121 (D. Neb. 1972). 
In another case which involved the question of whether 
or not state action was involved in a private university's denial 
of employment to two women, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the fact that a lesser amount of state involvement 
is needed to find state action in racial discrimination cases 
than in non-racial discrimination cases. It stated: 
Moreover we have recognized the existence of a "double 
standard11 in state action—"one, a less onerous test 
for cases involving racial discrimination, and a more 
rigorous standard for other claims," Jackson v. The 
Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d. Cir. 1974). . . ; 
Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405 (2d. Cir. 1975). 
At least two courts have refused to find that a court's 
acting in its judicial capacity as an impartial arbiter to settle 
disputes constituted state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court of Missouri was called upon 
to determine if a lower court's upholding of the validity of 
a trust which included provisions that the income from the trust 
be used to support Protestant Hospitals for the support and 
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care of sick and infirm white patients was constitutional. 
In upholding the validity of the trust despite the racial and 
religious overtones, the Court refused to categorize the lower 
court's participation in the case as state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. The court stated: 
Under the facts of this case, "state action" was not 
involved in the creation of the trust, nor is it required 
to carry out its terms. Mr. McWilliams was a private 
individual, and the corpus of his trust derived solely 
from his private funds. The trustee is a privately 
owned bank and it selects beneficiaries in each class 
in an exercise of unlimited discretion. . . . 
Nor has the court in construing this trust engaged 
in "sponsoring," "promoting," or "enforcing" discrimin-
ation, as in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, and Barrows 
v. Jackson, supra, where the court was asked to rule 
[sic] the legality of a restrictive covenant prohibiting 
real estate sales to blacks, and to implement the 
holding by affirmative judicial action such as ouster 
from possession of the black owner or granting a money 
judgment and execution. . . . 
If appellants1 arguments were sustained, then no transfer 
of property by will to a religious institution or 
to a person of a designated race could be valid if 
a construction of the will's provisions became necessary. 
Such is not an indicated result under the law. (Emphasis 
added). 
First National Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 523 S.W.2d 808, 
821 (Mo. 1975 ), reh'g or transfer to court en banc denied, 
cert, denied 95 S. Ct. 1999, 2424 (1975). 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar 
determination in a case involving a complaint by a tenant alleging 
her eviction from an apartment building which had received federal 
benefits in the form of mortgage insurance under the National 
Housing Act was without due process procedures. The court failed 
to find any state action involved and statedi 
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Neither, despite some language in Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S. Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948) 
can state action be found in New York providing defendant 
with the same right to secure eviction of a tenant 
by a proceeding in its courts that it gives to all 
landlords; the one thing now almost universally agreed 
is that such a rationale for that landmark decision 
would be altogether too far-reaching. 
McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc. , 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2nd Cir. 1970) . 
Since there is no racial discrimination involved in 
the case at bar and the lower court was not asked to take any 
positive action to enforce discrimination, the two preconditions 
for finding state action due to the court's involvement are 
not present as they were in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra. Therefore, 
this Court must find that merely using the state court system 
as a neutral arbiter to settle disputes among private parties 
does not constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
If the use of the courts to settle disputes over private 
real estate contracts or foreclosure proceedings were found 
to be state action, then the distinction between state action 
and private action as set forth over 100 years ago, and by which 
the judiciary has been guided since then, would be obliterated. 
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 27 L.Ed. 835, 3 S.Ct. 18 (1883), 
the principle has become firmly embedded in our consti-
tutional law that the action inhibited by the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action 
as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That 
Amendment erects no shield against merely private 
conduct, however discriminatory or wrong. 
Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 13. 
D. The Existence Of State Statutes Which Regulate 
The Enforcement Of Private Agreements Does Not Constitute State 
Action For Fourteenth Amendment Purposes. 
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Goodwills contend on page 6 of their brief that state 
action is present in the case at bar becuase the state has provided 
"facilities, services and extensive regulation which assist 
in foreclosure of a private agreement." As support for this 
contention, they offer four court decisions plus the fact of 
the existence of several Utah Code sections dealing with real 
property. 
This Court must reject this contention for several 
reasons. First of all, as noted above, there has been no foreclosure 
proceeding involved in this case. The Butlers, as private parties, 
merely repossessed their property from other private parties 
under the terms of a private agreement. There was no involvement 
of a sheriff or a court clerk or any other state official, nor 
was there reliance on any statute. The only involvement of 
the state at all was through its provision of a court system 
which has been called upon to act as a neutral arbitor to settle 
this dispute. The reasons why the involvement of the courts 
in this fashion does not constitute state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes was discussed in the preceeding section. 
Second, even if the existence of foreclosure statutes 
is considered applicable to the instant case by analogy, when 
analyzed carefully, the four cases relied on by Goodwills do 
not support the proposition that the state involvement in the 
case at bar is sufficient to constitute state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. The first case relied upon here by the 
Goodwills is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 
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(U.S. 1961). It was an action by a black for declaratory and 
injunctive relief against a restaurant located within an off-street 
parking building owned and operated by the Wilmington Parking 
Authority, an agency of the State of Delaware. The restaurant, 
the lessee of the Wilmington Parking Authority, refused to serve 
the black food or drink solely because of his race. 
A main issue in the case was whether the restaurant's 
refusal of service to the black was private action and so beyond 
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment or state action and so 
subject to the Amendment. In finding that it was state action, 
the Court outlined the extensive state involvement with the 
restaurant. It stated, 
The land and building were publicly owned. As an 
entity, the building was dedicated to "public uses" 
in performance of the Authority's "essential governmental 
functions." 22 Del. Code, Sections 501, 514. The 
cost of land acquisition, construction, and maintenance 
are defrayed entirely from donations by the City of 
Wilmington, from loans and revenue bonds and from 
the proceeds of rentals and parking services out of 
which the loans and bonds were payable. . . . [T]he 
commercially leased areas were not surplus state property, 
but constituted a physically and financially integral, 
and, indeed, indespensable part of the State's plan 
to operate its project as a self-sustaining unit. 
Upkeep and maintenance of the building, including 
necessary repairs, were responsibilities of the Authority 
and were payable out of public funds. It cannot be 
doubted that the peculiar relationship of the restaurant 
to the parking facility in which it is located confers 
on each an incidental variety of mutual benefits. . . . 
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In contrast to the extensive state involvement which 
the Court found existed in Burton, in thd case at bar, there 
was no state involvement. The Butlers acted as private parties 
to repossess their property from other private parties under 
the terms of a private agreement without the assistance or involve-
ment of any state officials. Therefore, the finding of state 
involvement for Fourteenth Amendment purposes by the Court in 
Burton does not dictate a similar finding by this Court in the 
instant case. In fact, the Court in Burton went out of the 
way to limit the impact of its holding. It ^tated: 
Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what 
we hold today is that when a State leases public property 
in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been 
the case here, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly 
as though they were binding covenants written into 
the agreement itself. 
Id. at 726. 
It should also be noted that Burton was a case involving 
racial discrimination whereas in the instant case there is no 
such discrimination involved. In the previously cited case 
of Weise v. Syracuse University, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals found this difference significant. it stated: 
As the conduct complained of becomes more offensive, 
and as the nature of the dispute becomes more amenable 
to resolution by a court, the more jappropriate it 
is to subject the issue to judicial scrutiny. This 
explains the willingness to find state action in racial 
discrimination cases although the same state-private 
relationship might not trigger such a finding in a 
case involving a different dispute over a different 
interest. 
Supra, at 406. 
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The Goodwills next rely on the case of Reitman v. Mulkey, 
387 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1967), for the proposition that the existence 
of statutes providing for Quiet Title Actions and for extensive 
property regulation amounts to state encouragement of the use 
of these statutes which constitutes state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. 
Upon close analysis, it is apparent that the findings 
in Reitman are not applicable to the case at bar. That case 
involved two actions wherein two couples sued apartment owners 
for racial discrimination, in one case for refusing to rent 
an apartment and in the other one for eviction. These actions 
required an interpretation of the constitutionality of a recent 
California initiative which amended the state constitution to 
prohibit the state from interfering in an owner's decision to 
sell, lease or rent his property to anyone he chose. The California 
Supreme Court found that this provision violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it allowed racial 
discrimination. 
In affirming the California Supreme Court's decision, 
the United States Supreme Court stated: 
[T] he State has taken affirmative action designed 
to make private discrimination legally possible. 
Section 26 [the amended section] was said [by the 
California Supreme Court] to have changed the situation 
from one in which discrimination was restricted "to 
one wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of 
the cited decisions"; Section 26 was legislative 
action "which authorized private discrimination" and 
made the State "at least a partner in the instant 
act of discrimination". . . . Here we are dealing 
with a provision which does not just repeal an existing 
law forbidding racial discrimination. Section 26 
34 
was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial 
discrimination in the housing market. The right to 
discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the 
Sta.te. 
Supra, at 375, 380-381. 
It seems apparent that the existenc^ of statutes author-
izing Quiet Title Actions and regulating propjerty is not positive 
state encouragement for private parties to repossess their property 
without providing notice in the same sense that the passage 
of the constitutional amendment forbidding state interference 
with the decisions of owners of property to decline to sell, 
lease or rent to any person was positive state encouragement 
for private racial discrimination. 
Therefore, the fact that the Supreme Court found state 
action in Reitman does not mandate that this Court find state 
action in the instant case. This is especially true when it 
is noted that Reitman involved racial discrimination, the very 
reason for the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Several federal courts have refused to apply Reitman 
to cases that did not involve racial discririiination. In a case 
which involved an automobile dealer's attempted repossession 
of a used car by self-help methods under a state statute, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the existence of the 
statute did not involve sufficient state action to confer federal 
jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act. In so holding, the 
court stated: 
The outer boundaries of "imputed" state actions have 
been charted primarily in race discrimination cases. 
We are unwilling to push out the frontier still farther 
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in a case devoid of racial overtones. The same consid-
eration compels us to reject appellee's argument based 
on Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 
18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1966). There again racial discrimination 
was involved. Moreover, the indicia of state involvement 
were much stronger, because, as the opinion made clear, 
the purpose of the challenged state constitutional 
amendment was to authorize private discrimination 
in the transfer of real property where before it had 
been barred by statute. 
James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1974). 
In a class action suit filed under the Civil Rights 
Act, the plaintiffs based their complaint on the claim that 
self-help repossession of automobiles subject to security interests 
were invalid. The federal district court found certain provisions 
of the state motor vehicle code invalid, but the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed because it found no state action and, 
therefore, no cause of action had been alleged under the Civil 
Rights Statute. In so doing, it stated: 
Nor do we find in the statutory scheme the kind of 
encouragement and fosterage of the alleged unconstitutional 
act as in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 
18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967). In Reitman, the State constitu-
tional amendment repealed prior state legislation 
regulating racial discrimination in housing. Thus, 
in effect, the state constitutionally authorized dis-
crimination by repealing prior law and by substantially 
inhibiting any subsequent change. The case before 
us is vastly dissimilar to the situation in Reitman. 
Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107, 1111 (3rd Cir. 1974). 
Based upon the authority of the above-cited cases, 
this Court should refuse to extend the rationale of Reitman 
to the case at bar which does not involve racial discrimination. 
Goodwills next cite Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage 
Association, 372 F.Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974) as support for 
their contention that the existence of state statutes allowing 
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Quiet Title Actions and regulating property id state encouragement 
of repossession procedures followed by Butlers and so is state 
action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. This case involved 
the contention that the existence of statutes regulating the 
foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement was sufficient state 
encouragement of the procedure so as to constitute state action 
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
Goodwills1 reliance on this case is misplaced because, 
although the federal district court foundi state action, the 
decision was reversed on appeal by the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals. In reversing, the court stated: 
The district court held the foreclosure proceeding 
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the 
Michigan Constitution of 1963. Because we find no 
significant state involvement in the foreclosure proceeding 
assailed here, we reverse the judgment of the district 
court. . . . 
This case differs materially from Reitman. Judge 
Peck, writing for the court in Turner v. Impala Motors, 
503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974), said that Reitman "deal [t] 
with a state attempt to accomplish indirectly what 
it was prohibited from doing directly. We cannot 
ignore the fact that the context of onerous racial 
discrimination in which the case was set demanded 
special scrutiny". 503 F. 2d at 611. In Turner and 
in Gary v. Darnell, 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974), 
we upheld the Tennessee and Kentucky legislatures1 
implementation of Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which authorizes a secured creditor to peacefully 
repossess collateral. 
In this case, as in Turner and Gary, we are not concerned 
with questions of racial discrimination or state use 
of indirect means to accomplish illegal ends. Like 
Turner and Gary, this case concerns a idemedy privately 
created by contract. 
What Judge Peck said in Turner applies as well here: 
It is clear that in this case the state did not exert 
any control or compulsion over the creditor's decision 
to repossess. The private activity was not commanded 
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by the simply permissive statute, . . . 
We fail to see where the creditor has sought to invoke 
any state machinery to its aid. Rather the creditor 
has simply relied upon the terms of its security agreement 
pursuant to the private right of contract. . . . 
We fail to see how the creditor is attempting to enforce 
any right in reliance upon a constitutional or statutory 
provision as in Reitman or is even asserting any state-
created right. Rather we see a creditor privately 
effectuating a right which was created in advance 
by contract between the parties. (Emphasis added) 
Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 527 F•2d 
23, 24, 26-28 (6th Cir. 1975). 
In the case at bar just as in the above cited case, 
the Butlers were not relying on any statutory provision but 
were "privately effectuating a right which was created in advance 
by contract between the parties," _^d*i when they repossessed 
their property from the Cornwells. Therefore, this Court must 
likewise find there was no state action for Fourteenth Amendment 
purposes involved in the instant case. 
Finally, Goodwills rely on Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Company, Inc. , 457 U.S. 922 (U.S. 1982), as support for their 
contention that state action exists in the case at bar. Lugar 
involved a situation wherein a supplier of the lessee-operator 
of a truck stop sued in state court for the debt owed it. Ancillary 
to that action and pursuant to state law, the supplier sought 
prejudgment attachment of some of the operator's property. 
Although the United States Supreme Court found state 
action in Lugar, the holding seems narrowly drawn. The Court 
stated: 
The prejudgment attachment procedure required only 
that Edmondson allege, in an ex parte petition, a 
belief that petitioner was disposing of or might dispose 
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of his property in order to defeat his creditors. 
Acting upon that petition, a Clerk of the state court 
issued a writ of attachment, which was then executed 
by the County Sheriff. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 924. The court went on to state: 





















party to a private dispute (Emphasis added.) 
.Id. at 942. 
It seems clear from the underlined language that the 
Court based its decision in Lugar not upon the existence of 
a statutory scheme which regulated property and provided for 
court settlement of private disputes, but upon the existence 
of a statutory scheme whereby state officials, a court clerk 
and a county sheriff, attached property upon the ex parte application 
of one party to a private dispute. Since in the case at bar 
there was no ex parte application and no court clerk, county 
sheriff or any other state official involved in Butler's private 
repossession of their property from the other private parties 
under the terms of a private contract, Lugar does not mandate 
the finding that the existence of state statutes allowing Quiet 
Title Actions and providing for the regulation of property is 
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposds. 
Three separate state supreme courts have refused to 
find state action in situations analogous to the instant case. 
In a 1975 case involving a foreclosure proceeding under a power 
of sale, the complaint attacked the constitutionality of various 
sections of state statutes because they failed to provide for 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court 
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of Georgia rejected these attacks, stating: 
The power of sale may not be utilized except under 
the provisions of a contract and if exercised the 
statute provides the manner in which such power is 
to be exercised. It is a purely contractual matter 
between two parties in the exercise of private property 
rights. There is insufficient meaningful government 
involvement to constitute state action by the mere 
adoption of statutes providing for the sale of real 
estate under powers contained in mortgages, debts, 
deeds or other lien contracts where the grant of such 
power is contained in the contract between the parties 
thereto. No government official or agency is involved 
in such process. (Emphasis added). 
Coffey Enterprises Realty and Development Company, Inc. v. Holmes, 
213 S.E.2d 882, 884 (Ga. 1975). 
The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc also 
refused to find state action in a case that involved the foreclosure 
of a deed of trust pursuant to a power of sale. In so doing, 
the Court stated: 
In Federal National Mortgage Association v. Howlett, 
521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. Banc 1975) this court was presented 
with the issue of whether the statutory provisions 
relating to the foreclosure of deeds of trust under 
a power of sale are unconstitutional on the basis 
that they violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth. 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. The same 
basic issue is presented again in this case. . . . 
We also held in Howlett that the fact that the statutory 
provisions relating to extrajudicial foreclosure recognize 
and authorize, and thus possibly encourage, use of 
the procedure authorized by contract, or the fact 
that a purchaser at such a foreclosure sale may use • 
the state courts to enforce righis to possession thereby 
acquired, does not render the foreclosure proceedings 
such significant "state action" as is required to 
make the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause appli-
cable, i 
The Fourteenth Amendment questions presented in this 
case are essentially the same as those presented in 
Howlett. The holding in Howlett that extrajudicial 
foreclosure which has been authorized by agreement 
expressed in the security instrument does not involve 
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significant state action, notwithstanding applicable 
statutory provisions, supplies the answers to all 
of defendants1 Fourteenth Amendment due process questions. 
The foreclosure of the deed of trust on defendants1 
property was pursuant to a power expressly granted 
by that instrument and not to any power authorized 
or encouraged by state law. (Emphasis added). 
Federal National Mortgage Association v. Scoj tt, 548 S.W.2d 545, 
548-549 (Mo. 1977). 
Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court also refused to 
find state action in a case wherein the mortgagor's debt was 
accelerated and his property sold by the mortgagee under the 
terms of their contract. The Court stated: 
The essence of plaintiff's constitutional argument 
is that the foreclosure statute grants a mortgagee 
the power to terminate a mortgage relationship by 
use of procedures that are not in harmony with the 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment^ to the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the 
Michigan Constitution. Specifically, she claims that 
the Mighican foreclosure by advertisement statute, 
as applied, violated the due process clauses of the 
two constitutions in that it requires neither a notice 
of hearing, nor a hearing to establish tjie debt. . . . 
Since the power of sale is an incident of the private 
right to contract, [citation omitted], a mortgagee 
who exercises a foreclosure option is relying on a 
contract remedy, and not on a right created by statute. 
[Sic] 527 F.2d 26-27. Therefore, the state cannot 
be said to be significantly involved, through "encourage-
ment," in the challenged conduct, and a due process 
question is consequently not presented. . . . 
Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff's instant 
claim of unconstitutionality under both the Michigan 
and Federal Constitution fails for lack of the existence 
of state action. 
Cramer v. Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association, 258 N.W.2d 
20, 22-23 (Mich. 1977). 
In a previously cited case involving a car buyer who 
brought an action against a car dealer for resorting to self-help 
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repossession as permitted in the contract between the parties 
and as allowed by state statute, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals refused to find state action. In so doing, it stated: 
This case presents the issue as to whether peaceful 
repossession under the Tennessee statute is action 
under the color of state law within the meaning of 
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and state action within the 
meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . 
It is clear that in this case the state did not exert 
any control or compulsion over the creditor's decision 
to repossess. The private activity was not commanded 
by the simply permissive statute. . . . 
We fail to see where the creditor has sought to invoke 
any state machinery to its aid. Rather, the creditor 
has simply relied upon the terms of its security agreement 
pursuant to the private right of contract. (Emphasis 
added). 
Turner v. Impala Motors, supra, at 608, 611. 
In a later case involving a nursing home resident 
receiving federal assistance under the medicaid program who 
was threatened with eviction, a federal district court refused 
to find state action. It stated: 
Moreover, the cases also indicate that even the combination 
of limited public funding and State regulation does 
not transmute private action into state action. . . . At 
most the State, by failing to require a hearing prior 
to eviction has acquiesced in the private entity's 
conduct. The Supreme Court, however, "has never held 
that a State's mere acquiescence in a private action 
converts that action into that of the State." (Empasis 
added). 
Wagner v. Sheltz, 471 F.Supp. 903, 908 (D. Conn. 1979) quoting 
Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (U.S. 1978). 
Thus, it seems clear from the authorities cited that 
this Court must find that the mere provision by the State of 
Utah of facilities, services and statutes which assist in 
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the foreclosure of private agreements does hot constitute state 
action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. The Court should 
so find both because each of the four cases relied on by the 
Goodwills to support this proposition has been shown to be inappli-
cable to the case at bar and numerous other authorities have 
been cited which have held in analagous Situations that the 
provision of similar facilities, services and statutes by the 
state is insufficient state involvement in a right created by 
a private agreement to constitute state action for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes. 
If this Court were to find otherwise, that distinction 
articulated in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (U.S. 1883), 
between state action which is subject to the prohibitions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and private action which is not would 
be blurred beyond recognition. Several courts have articulated 
their concern that under such a holding v 
action would become state action: 
irtually all private 
Virtually all formal private arrangements assume, 
at some point, the supportive role of the state. 
To hold that the state, by recognizing the legal effect 
of those arrangements, converts them into state acts 
for constitutional purposes would effectively erase 
to a significant extent the constitutional line between 
private and state action and subject to judicial scrutiny 
under the Fourteenth Amendment virtually all private 
arrangements that purport to have binding legal effect. 
Garfinkle v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 578 P.2d 
925, 932 (Cal. 1978), quoting Berrera v. Security Building and 
Investment Corporation, 519 F.2d 1166, 1170 ^5th Cir. 1975). 
The Court finds little significance ±rfi the fact that 
a clerk may perform the ministerial act of recording 
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the deed under power evidencing sale or that the courts 
of the State of Georgia may enforce the agreements 
the parties have made. Were these factors considered 
determinative, every private agreement between citizens 
would be imbued with state action. 
Global Industries, Inc. v. Harris, 376 F.Supp. 1379, 1383 
(N.D. Ga. 1974). 
Similarly, if it is to be said that any act by an 
individual is state action if the state's law permits 
it, almost every act by an individual becomes state 
action. Such long-settled rights of private property 
as possessory liens of every type would be subject 
to being swept away, because of the inability to give 
notice and to hold a hearing prior to the holding 
of possession. 
Pease v. Havelock National Bank, supra, at 121. 
At least an aspect of appellees' argument, distilled 
to its essense, is that when a state attempts to compre-
hensively regulate on area of private conduct, its 
failure to prohibit is equivalent to "state action." 
Such a rule, however, would virtually obliterate the 
distinction between state and private action. As 
the Ninth Circuit noted in Adams v. Southern California 
First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330-331 (9th Cir. 1973): 
"Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private 
activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, 
and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state 
law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the 
state action concept. . . . If we were to accept 
the debtors' broad test, it would be very difficult 
to draw any line between state and private action." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Gibbs v. Titelman, supra, at 1112. 
This Court, too, must refuse "to obliterate the distinction 
between state and private action" in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs-Respondents' grantors, 
private parties, repossessed their property under the terms 
of their private contract with other private parties and without 
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the assistance of any state officials and without relying on 
any state statute. The Defendants-Appellants contend that this 
action violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process right 
to notice and a hearing because somehow state action was involved. 
This Court must reject Defendants-Appellants1 argument 
and affirm the lower court's order granting Summary Judgment 
to the Plaintiffs-Respondents for several reasons. First, to 
do so would follow the precedent set by this Court and other 
state supreme courts in cases involving very similar fact patterns. 
Second, the United States Supreme Court and a California 
court have held in an analagous situation that junior lien holder's 
rights can be cut off without notice. 
Third, the Fourteenth Amendment is not applicable 
to the case at bar because there was absolutely no state action 
involved in Butlers' repossession of their property under the 
terms of their private contract. Virtually all of the cases 
cited by Defendants-Appellants Goodwills as support for their 
contention involved racial discrimination, a particular concern 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and one which requires lesser state 
involvement for a finding of state action than do cases such 
as the one at bar where no racial discrimination is involved. 
Fourth, numerous authorities have held that the mere 
existence of state statutes and the availability of courts as 
j 
neutral arbitors to settle disputes do not constitute such state 
involvement in private disputes as to constitute state action 
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. 
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Finally, if the Court were to find that state action 
is present in the case at bar, that distinction articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court over 100 years ago between 
private action and state action would be hopelessly blurred, 
leading to more and more involvement of the government into 
the private contracts and lives of individual citizens. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this 
Court affirm the order of the Second Judicial District Court 
granting Summary Judgment to the Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X /^f- day of February, 
1985. 




Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Darwin Dirks and Jacquelyn Dirks 
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CERTIFICATE OF BAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 0f^Jr day of February, 
1985, I deposited for mailing in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing to EARL S. SPAFFORD 
and LYNN C. SPAFFORD, Spafford, Dibb, Duffin and Jensen, attorneys 
for Defendants-Appellants Wilf ord W. Goodwill and Dorothy P. Goodwill 
at 311 South State Street, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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"THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD SEEK OTHER COMPETENT ADVICE." 
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT 
May 1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 1 5 t h day o( . 
by and between Alma S. Butler and Wanda R« Butler, husband and wife 
, A. DM 19 79 , 
hereinafter designated a* the Seller, and Paul S, Cornwell and Catherine. If Cormmn, ftuabanri ft wife 
as joint tenants with ful l right of survivorship and not aa tenants in comaon. 
hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of ________.-_______--—_---__-_.—--________-__-___-——--
2. . W I T N E S S E T H : Thac the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, si tuate in 
Weber the county of _, S ta te of Utah, to-wit: 
More part icularly described as follows: 
Lot 21, Block 3t Herefordshire Subdivision No. 2, "Planned Residential Development", 
Roy City, Weber County, Utah. 
3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of . 
Seventy-one Thousand and No/lOO Dollars (f. 71. 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order . _ 
strictly within the following times, to-wit: Siflfat Thousand and No/100 -
 (|_ 8.000.00 J 
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of % 63»QC 'C iQQ shall be paid as follows: 
In monthly installments of $506.92 each month commencing July 1* 1978 said continuing 
nonthly thereafter until the principal and the interest are paid in full. In addition 
to this monthly figure, there will be an additional $5*000 balloon payment due Nov. 15, 
1979* The buyer herein will also deposit with Citizens National ft*wV $55.00 a month 
to cover taxes and insurance which will be paid."to. sellers to reimburse them toe-taxes 
and -insurance premiums. . ... If this sua becomes insufficient, the 
amount will increase according to the amounts due on tax & insurance. 
The Buyer agrees to pay a 5% late charge for any payment made 15 days after due. 
15th day of . May 19_ Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the -
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from Hfcr 15. 1978 
on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the ra te of P j ; ^ _ J ^ n e - H u y ^ f frent ( 9 1 / U 95?) per annum. The Buyer, a t his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future 
instal lments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation agains t said property in favor of 
Ogden First Federal Savings and Loan Association 
l+3t$03o6U as of April 1, 1978 
with an unpaid balance of 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said prop-
erty, except the following ^ O n e 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the 
then unpa i - > : . . : . - c : balance hereunder, bearing t n u . ^ t a . U:e i t su of not is exceed I fli»H - h r ^ s ' ? n a r e e r f r e r C w t t ; 
( 9 3A, ) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be g rea te r than each instal lment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages . 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his r ight through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outs tanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations, P repayment penalties in respect 
to obligations agains t said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement , shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
none 
A-l 
The Seller further covenants &nd agret. that he will not default in the payment of his oDhgations against said property. 
12. The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes after Haff 15» 1978 
13. The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract, or $ 
and to assign said insurance to the Seller as his interests may r.ppear and to deliver the insurance policy to him. 
14. In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment o/ any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance 
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either 
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon demand, all such sums so advanced 
and paid by. him, together with interest thereon from date of payment of aaid sums at the rate of % of one percent per 
month until paid. 
"T3:—Buyer agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be •ommitted any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon 
said premises, and that he will maintain said prejnises in good condition. y. 
—" 16. In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof~5y the Buyer, ofTfpbn failure of the Buyer to make \ 
""any payment or payments-"wfcen the "same shall become due, or within <?2 days thereafter, the 
Seller, at his option shall have the following alternative renifedjea: ~ - "_JHZ. "~~— 
f- A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of "the Buyer to remedy the default within_±Q_days after written notice, 
I to be released from all obligations in law and in equity to convey said property, and all payments which have j been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for 
the non-performance of the contract, and the Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his option re-enter and take 
( possession o: 3aid premises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with ail improve-
1 ments and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and the said additions and improvements shall remain with 
^ the_ land ajid .become .the property of the Seller, the Buyer becoming at once a tenant at will of the Seller; or 
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments, including costs and attorneys 
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at his option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or 
C. The Seller shall have the rig-it, at his option, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to declare the entire unpaid 
balance hereunder at once due and payable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note and mortage, and pass 
title to the Buyer subject thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah, and have the property sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing, 
including costs and attorney's fees; and the Seller may have a judgement for any deficiency which may remain. 
In the case of foreclosure, tne Seller hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall be immediately entitled to 
the appointment of a rc-Cfivrr to take possession oi said mortgaged property and collect the rents, issues and 
profits therefrom and ap, ly the same to the payment of the obligation hereunder, or hold the same pursuant 
to order of the court; and the Seller, upon entry of judgment of foreclosure, shall be entitled to the possession 
of the said premises during the period of redemption. 
17. It is agreed that time is the essence of this agreement. 
18. In the event there are any liens or encumbrances against said premises other than those herein provided for or 
referred to, or in the event any liens or encumbrances other than herein provided for shall hereafter accrue against the 
same by acts or neglect of tne Seller, then the Buyer may, at his option, pay and discharge the same and receive credit 
on the amount then remaining due hereunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay-
ments herein provided to be m^t' , may, at the option of the Buyer, be suspended until 3uch a time as such suspended 
payments shall equal any sums advanced as aforesaid. 
19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned 
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the 
above described premises free and clear of all encumbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued 
by or through the acts or neglect of the Buyer, and to furnish at his expense, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller, an abstract brought to date at time of sale or at any time during the 
term of this agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at the option of Buyer. 
20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property 
in its present condition and that there are no representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
1 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto . 
21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here-
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
or accrue from enforcing this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State oi Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit 
or otherwise. 
22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, suc-
cessors, and assigns of the respective parties hereto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names, the day and year 
first above written. 






" ^ S '' 
Seller 
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